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ABSTRACT 
 
This article aims at explaining factors affecting the successfulness of coastal communities of 
Gili Indah in constructing a governance structure of coral reef management. Coral reef management in 
this region has changed from an ineffective state regime to a local governance. From the perspective 
institutional economic theories, the emergence of a governance is an institutional change phenomena 
that are affected, among others, by actors’ characteristics such as organizational experiences, 
opportunistic behavior, environmental awareness/perception, planning horizon, bargaining power, 
technological skill and certainty; and trust, distrust and reputation. Using a distributional conflict 
theory of institutional change, the results of this research can draw a conclusion that institutional 
change process of coral reef management in the locality was strongly assumed affected by those factors.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Institution is defined as constraints devised 
to shape political, economic and social 
interactions (North, 1990). Far before this 
definition, Schmid (1972) has defined 
institutions a set of ordered relationships 
among people that define their rights, 
exposure to the rights of others, privileges 
and responsibilities. Schotter (1981) viewed 
institutions as regulations on behavior that 
are agreed to by all member of a society, and 
which prescribe behavior in specific,  
 
 
recurrent situations. Ostrom (1990: 51) 
defined institutions as a set of working rules 
that are used to determine who is eligible to 
make decisions in some arena, what actions 
are allowed or constrained, what aggregation 
rules will be used, what procedures must be 
followed, what information must or must not 
be provided, and what payoffs will be 
assigned to individuals dependent on their 
actions. Hamilton (1932) defines institution 
from the perspective of sociology as a way of 
thought or action of some prevalence and 
permanence, which is embedded in the habits 
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of a group or the customs of a people. A 
similar definition comes from Knight (1992: 
2), who considers an institution to be a set of 
rules that structures social interaction in 
particular ways.  
By its form, written and unwritten, 
institutions can be classified into informal 
and formal. Informal institutions like social 
norms, customary laws, habits and customs 
are commonly unwritten. These come into 
existence unintentionally or evolve 
spontaneously (North, 1990; Knight, 1992). 
Informal institutions play an important role. 
In a chaotic or crises situation due to, for 
example, war, they can be persistent as rules 
that sustain a social construction. A lot of 
ethnic groups in the world such as Jews, 
Kurds and countless other groups have 
persisted through centuries, despite endless 
changes in their formal rules due to wars, 
revolutions and military occupation. A state 
may be in ruin, but the social norms, culture 
and habits embedded in its communities may 
continue to exist (North, 1990: 35).  
Different from the first, formal 
institutions generally have a written form. 
These include political rules, economic rules, 
contracts and agreements. Formal institutions 
have taken a unidirectional move from 
formerly informal ones. Such changes are a 
necessary response of people who are 
moving from less to more complex societies, 
which need standardized weights and 
measurements, and, because they may face 
more complex disputes, naturally need to 
formalize constraints in writing (North, 
1990).  
2. Distributional Conflict Theories of   
Institutional Change 
 
With respect to institutional change, Knight 
(1992) analyzes it from the perspective of 
distributional conflict theories. These 
theories of institutional change are 
principally based on the assumption that each 
strategic actor in an action situation has 
different interests and power, which dispose 
the actors to become involved in conflicts of 
 interest. To resolve the conflict, the actors 
attempt to find some solution according to 
power resources that they have. The actors 
who can control power resources such as 
information, political access, capital, and skill 
tend to control and influence the process of 
institutional change and, finally, resolve 
conflicts by changing or creating rules that 
favour their interest. The target of such 
change is to satisfy the interests of 
individuals, not to achieve collective interests 
(Knight, 1992: 146). The change processes 
themselves can emerge either intentionally or 
merely as a consequence of the pursuit of 
strategic advantages. 
Distributional-conflict theories of 
institutional change are a universal theory in 
the sense of its capability to explain 
institutional change at all institutional levels, 
and applicable to both formal and informal 
institutions. Changes in informal rules can be 
accomplished intentionally, due to different 
interests and asymmetries of power (Knight, 
1992: 147). According to Knight (1995), 
changes in the distribution of power give self-
interested actors an incentive to change their 
institutional setting toward one that favors 
their interest. He further emphasized that the 
new institutional setting reflects the self-
interest of the economic actors, regardless of 
whether the change will generate a more 
efficient institution or not. Knight (1992) 
contends that it is better to explain the on-
going development of social institutions as a 
by-product of conflict over distribution gain 
than as a Pareto-superior response to 
collective goals or benefits. 
Regarding power, Knight (1992) 
defined it as people’s ability to affect other 
people to act in accordance with their wishes. 
Let us say that ‘A’ is more powerful than ‘B’ 
if A intentionally or unintentionally can force 
B to adopt a rule whose main idea comes 
from A or which is made by A, even though, 
in the end, the benefit of the institution may 
be distributed to both A and B. The actors or 
groups of actors who possess more power will 
have a better bargaining position to force the 
weaker groups to comply with institutional 
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rules, whether they want to do so or not. 
They respect these institutional rules not 
because they agree with them, nor because 
the rules give benefits to them, but simply 
because they cannot do better than to do so.  
Having discussed asymmetric 
power’s influence on institutional change, 
the question now is what kind of power 
needs to be possessed by strategic actors in 
order to influence institutional change or to 
create a new social institution? With respect 
to this, Knight (1992: 175) offered several 
key components, which he calls “power 
resources”. These include information, 
organisability, credible commitment and 
sanction power.  
(1)  Information is needed in order to 
compete. Strategic actors who endeavor 
to control information and are familiar 
with the expectations and strategy of 
those with whom they interact have a 
greater potential to win the competition. 
With the mastery of information, they 
can choose a strategy that can maximize 
their individual benefits. In other words, 
they can change an established 
institution or create a new one in 
accordance with their wishes.   
(2)  Organisability is important primarily at 
the political level because they can 
influence decision-making process. The 
actors who have good organisability will 
likely have better bargaining power than 
those who do not. They can better 
organize and act collectively.  
(3) Credible commitment is a believable 
attitude demonstrated by actors that they 
will in fact do what they claim to. Actors 
with good credibility of commitment, in 
other words those with a good 
reputation, will more easily convince 
other actors. With this power resource 
an actor can determine the choices of 
other people (Knight, 1992).  
(4) Sanction power is a mechanism used 
to enforce external institutions, that is, a 
threat of sanction by a third-party enforcer. It 
is a common feature of many social 
institutions, such as state or powerful group 
enforcement of sanctions against prohibited 
actions. With this power, a group of actors 
can force others to accept their alternative. It 
can be employed so as to discourage a certain 
strategy of actors. To be a successful 
deterrent, the sanction must be sufficiently 
severe so as to reduce the potential benefit of 
violating the institution, to the point that this 
is no longer the dominant and preferred 
strategy (Knight, 1992). 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
This is a case study conducted in Gili Indah 
village, West lombok, Indonesia. The data 
collection took place in May and June 2003, 
carried out using a triangular technique: a 
combination of interviews, direct 
observations and document analysis. 
Interviews involved 42 respondents from 
different stakeholders, applying semi-
structured and open-ended questionnaire, 
while the observations were conducted 
through participating in community activities 
that relate to the research objectives. Books, 
journals, official archives, project reports, 
personal and official documents were also a 
valuable information sources. The collected 
information was then analyzed qualitatively 
using mainly distributional conflict theory of 
Knight (1992).  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Actors and Stakeholder Involved 
Institutional change in coral reef 
management in Gili Indah Village, West 
Lombok, involved six main actors. These 
actors are regarded as being both direct and 
indirect participants in the local level 
governance structure. They are: (1) 
fishermen; (2) tourism business operators 
(TBOs), represented by Ecotrust (Trawangan 
Diving Company Association) and APGA 
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(Association of Gili Air Entrepreneurs); (3) 
SATGAS; (4) village administration; (5) 
Natural Resources Conservation Agency 
(BKSDA); (and 6) the Convention Board of 
North Lombok Fishermen Societies 
(LMNLU). The process of institutional 
change and self-governance in the 
management of the coral reefs of Gili Indah 
rely upon these actors. Therefore, detailed 
identification of the actors is necessary.  
Using this theoretical framework of 
Hagedorn et al. (2002) and Knight (1992) as 
guides,  the predominant attributes of actors 
involved in coral reef use and management in 
Gili Indah are identified as follows: 
environmental experience; opportunistic 
behavior; environmental 
awareness/perception; planning horizon; 
bargaining power; technological skills and 
certainty; and trust, distrust and reputation 
(Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Actors Involved in Coral Reef Management and their Characteristics 
Actors Predominant attributes 
 OE OB EA/P PH BP TS T/R 
Fishermen Low High Low Short Low/High Low n.c 
TBO (Ecotrust, APGA) High n.c High Long High n.c Good 
SATGAS High n.c High Long High n.c Good 
Village administration High n.c High n.c High n.c Bad 
BKSDA High n.c High Long High n.c Bad 
LMNLU (Extern)  n.c n.c n.c n.c n.c n.c n.c 
 
Notes: OE: Organizational Experience; OB: Opportunistic Behavior; EA/P: Environmental Awareness/ 
Perception; PH: Planning Horizon; BP: Bargaining Power; TS: Technological Skill; T/R: 
Trust/Reputation; [NB: ‘n.c’ means not characterized]  
 
Fishermen 
 
In order to adequately understand the 
fishermen’s attributes this subchapter begins 
by highlighting the predominant livelihood 
patterns of Gili Indah residents. Long before 
tourism industry entered the region, fishing 
and farming were the two main livelihoods 
of the Gili Indah community. However, since 
tourism came there in 1977, the livelihood 
pattern has shifted, from fishing and farming 
to tourism-related business or work 
associated with tourism. The shift was 
inevitable, given that fishing activities 
became more difficult parallel to the 
decrease of the fish stock and the increase of 
fishing costs which are a consequence of the 
requirement to move from one fishing 
ground to others in order to reap a good catch 
of fish. At the same time, tourism, which 
grows rapidly, offered greater hope and 
certainty for the future, so that it became 
more welcome in the hearts of most Gili 
Indah villagers. Thus, Gili Indah was rather 
rapidly changed from a fisherman to a tourist 
village.  
In spite of the change in livelihood 
pattern, not all fishermen are adaptable to the 
new livelihood. Some of them continue to 
retain fishing as their main livelihood.  From 
the 693 families residing in Gili Indah village, 
150 are fisherman families1, both as juragan 
(owners or shareholders) and sawi (workers). 
Looking at the number, they are a minority; 
however, they cannot be easily ignored. They 
are descendants of village founders who were 
also fishermen. Therefore, their claim to be 
the main beneficiaries of the available marine 
                                                
1
   Up to 2002, according to logs of the 
village administration, there were 100 
fisherman families living in Gili Indah; 
however, the fieldwork revealed that 150 
fisherman families reside on the island. 
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resources, as illustrated in the statements 
below is understandable. 
“If we are not allowed to fish here, to get our 
living from the coral reefs, where must we 
move to? We have no other choice for living. 
We, fishermen, inherited the islands along 
with their resources. Thus, we have more 
rights than tourism operators who came later. 
Why should we move? We will never leave 
these islands and will retain our inherited 
livelihood”(Hidayat, 2005) 
Due to their strategically strong 
position in the social setting, the fishermen 
can significantly affect processes of 
institutional change and local governance 
construction in coral reef management. As 
shown in Table 1, these actors are 
characterized by low organizational 
experience, opportunistic behavior, low 
environmental awareness or misperception 
regarding coral reef resources, short planning 
horizon, low bargaining power, and low 
technological skill. Those attributes may 
affect their potential role in governing coral 
reef ecosystems in the locality in a way 
which we will now explain in detail. 
 
a. Lack of organizational experiences 
 
Classified as traditional fishermen, all of Gili 
Indah fishermen apply various artisanal 
fishing devices. They operate either small-
sized outboard motor boats less than 5 Gross 
Tons (GT) in weight or non-motorized small 
boats of similar weight. Up to the middle of 
2002, they were grouped by the fishing tools 
they used. There have been five groups 
parallel the five kinds of fishing devices they 
commonly use.2 Each group has several 
subgroups;3 therefore, it is not surprising that 
                                                
2
  The fishing devices include: (1) Muroami, (2) 
Jaring Sret/Jaring Gae, (3) Mogong, (4) 
Pancing, and (5) Bagang boats. 
3
  Consider the groups are A, B,…, G (names of 
fishing devices). There could be A1, 
A2,…An, B1, B2,.., Bn, G1, G2…Gn.   
the fishermen were distributed over 47 groups 
beyond 68 anglers and 81 archers.  
Such unorganized situation had lasted 
for a long period of time. But it just stopped 
on 15 December 2002 after the formation of 
the Gili Indah Fisherman Association shaped 
to help solve a serious physical conflict 
between TBOs and Muroami users that 
erupted on 17 August 2002.4 This long 
unorganized situation of fishermen has 
contributed to their lack of organizational 
experience, which in the end has become a 
source of fisherman powerlessness in 
bargaining with public politicians and other 
actors. At the local level, as expressed by the 
head of the Gili Indah Fisherman Association, 
before this association existed, fishermen 
could not negotiate with other actors to deal 
with local issues, moreover express their 
opinion or interest to the public policy makers 
whose action affected their interests. In other 
words, they were powerless to act and 
struggle for their interest collectively. A 
fisherman involved in a meeting in the village 
office, for instance, could not claim himself 
as a representative of all fishermen of Gili 
Indah. He could not talk on behalf of all 
fishermen. This condition had lasted for a 
long period; however, in the past, it seemed 
not to be a problem because the problems 
                                                
4
  Since the presence of the tourism industry in 
the region, physical conflicts between 
fishermen and TBOs have almost occurred 
several times. The interviewed fishermen 
expressed that physical conflicts almost 
erupted in July, 2000, and August, 1998. 
However, these could be stopped due to 
kinship relation among the conflicting parties. 
According to respondents, the physical conflict 
that erupted on 17 August, 2002, was the first 
real physical conflict. This occurred when they 
were fishing, as usually applying  Muroami, 
within a certain area near Gili Trawangan, 
when suddenly they were attacked by 
SATGAS officers. The SATGAS itself 
admitted this action. They did so because they 
considered that the fishermen were fishing 
within a prohibited zone (zone of diving) 
according to local awig-awig. 
Journal of Coastal Development                                                                                                                                       ISSN : 1410-5217 
Volume 10, Number 2, February 2007  :  73-88                                                                                  Accredited  : 23a / Dikti / Kep / 2004 
 
 
 
How Distributional Conflicts Theory Explain Factors Affecting Institutional Changes in Coral Reef Governance? Lessons learned from 
Gili Indah Village, West Lombok Indonesia 
 
 
 
 
78 
themselves were simpler than those they face 
today.    
 
b. Distrust and credible commitment 
 
In addition to a lack of organisability, 
fishermen also developed a bad image 
(impression) as a distrusted group from 
financial institutions (banks). The distrust is 
not because they are morally bad, but 
because their livelihood (fishing) is regarded 
to be economically risky and uncertain, a 
characteristic related to the physical qualities 
of the fishery resources. Banks cannot lend 
them capital if they are unsure, for instance, 
when and how they can return it. In other 
words, the fishermen cannot make a credible 
commitment particularly on this matter. This 
has caused them to become powerless to 
access sources of capital. There is no a single 
bank in West Lombok that is willing to lend 
money or other forms of capital to them, 
including Folk Bank (Folk Bank of the 
Republic of Indonesia, BRI), which should 
serve the interests of farmers, fishermen, and 
other small-scale economic actors. 
In order to satisfy their needs for 
capital (boats, motors, nets and so on) they 
have had to make use of private or personal 
lenders with the consequence of having to 
pay higher interest than that offered by 
banks. Or, they expect project aid from the 
government or an international donor 
organization which usually discontinues. 
This situation has caused fishermen not only 
to continue to be a dependent and 
marginalized group, but also has reduced 
their bargaining power. This low bargaining 
power could also be seen when the coral reef 
ecosystems were established as a conserved 
area. The shifting of the status from non-
conserved to conserved area has of course 
reduced or constrained their fishing space, 
which clearly could damage their economic 
interests.  
 
 
 
c. High solidarity 
 
Even though, on one hand, they lack of 
organisability, on the other hand the 
fishermen have good inter-individual 
relationships which is here restricted to 
relationships among peers. Among them, 
there is high solidarity. For example, when 
they witness fishermen applying blast-fishing 
methods they will not inform on them to coast 
guard officers. They do not want to hurt or 
cause their colleagues get into difficulties. 
The solidarity among them is considered as a 
power resource which to a certain extent can 
increase their bargaining power and affect 
village-level policies. The ineffectiveness of 
the state property regime in this location 
could be, among other factors, caused by this 
power.  
 
d. Information  
 
Fishermen also have good information on the 
situation of Gili Indah village. They know 
very well the situation of the islands because 
they are native inhabitants. This sense for the 
surroundings has even caused a governmental 
policy imposed to them, i.e., the patrol of Gili 
Indah waters by the navy, to become 
ineffective. This is so because fishermen, 
when they are fishing illegally and have been 
found out, know exactly where they have to 
go to deceive pursuing navy officers. They 
also know about their rights over fisheries and 
coral reef resources as registered fishermen. 
This also can increase their bargaining power 
and influence local level policies. 
 
 
e. Short planning horizon 
Mostly, Gili Indah fishermen are 
classified as subsistence fishermen who fish 
only for meeting primary daily needs. 
However, it often happens that the income is 
not sufficient for these needs. Muroami (the 
main fishing device among fisherman in Gili 
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Indah), net of operational cost, could only 
generate some Rp15,000, equal to around 
$1.8, per week (six work days). This low 
income has a negative impact on the quality 
of their children’s education. Gili Indah 
fishermen generally cannot send their 
children to pursue higher level education. 
After completing elementary school the boys 
of fishermen immediately become fishermen 
themselves. They do so to lower the 
economic responsibility of their parents.  
Poverty has driven them to think and 
act pragmatically. Their incapability of 
generating an alternative livelihood has made 
fishermen tend to maximize present benefits 
from the coral reefs. This becomes a more 
serious problem because at the same time 
they lack technological capacities. Their 
strong dependence on the resources does not, 
however, prevent them from exploitative 
behavior, which could be caused by, among 
other reasons, the absence of exclusive 
property rights. This has caused the 
fishermen not to have economic certainty 
about the future. An interviewed fisherman 
was reluctant to invest in coral reef 
protection (conservation, management) 
because he had no guarantee of getting 
returns from what invested. He was also 
unsure whether his children would inherit the 
resources. Therefore, he maximizes the 
present benefits from the coral reef 
ecosystems like other fishermen do.  
 
f. Environmental Awareness and 
Misperception 
 
The Gili Indah community (not only 
fishermen) has differing levels of awareness 
concerning coral reef ecosystems. According 
to their level of awareness, the community 
members can be classified into three groups: 
(1) Groups who realize that their livelihood 
and future life are dependent on the reef 
ecosystems. Belonging to this group are 
TBOs or those whose livelihood either 
directly or indirectly depends on the tourism 
industry. (2) Groups that have less 
environmental awareness and misperception. 
They are, for example, blast-fishermen who 
think that there is no interrelatedness between 
coral reef destruction and fish abundance, and 
believe that fish will never become scare, in 
spite of coral reef disappearance. The 
following statements of two fishermen may 
show the environmental awareness and 
misperception:“…We have been fisherman 
for a long time. We only know this for a living 
as did our fathers. Since we have become 
fisherman more than 25 years ago, fish is 
always available here. God supplies it for us 
as well as for the next generations, in spite of 
coral reef extinction…” (Hidayat, 2005). (3) 
Groups that are aware of the importance of 
the reef as a fish habitat; however, the 
awareness does not drive them to take any 
real safeguarding measures. When witnessing 
people applying destructive fishing methods, 
members of these groups will not inform the 
marine security officers. The following 
interviewed fisherman’s statements illustrate 
this mindset: 
“I know some fishermen who sometimes 
apply bombs. I know their action may damage 
coral reef ecosystems. However, I do not have 
the heart to report them to the police or 
marine guard. They do that for a living…” 
(Hidayat, 2005). 
 
g. Opportunistic behavior 
 
There are three categories of opportunistic 
behavior which are often found in CPR 
uses, i.e., free riding, rent seeking and 
corruption (Ostrom, 1997). (1) Free riding 
is the behavior of people who are willing 
to enjoy the benefits of an investment 
which they themselves have not made any 
contributions toward generating them.  
For example, one can enjoy 
environmental cleanness while not 
contributing toward producing this 
outcome. (2) Rent seeking is an effort to 
influence the decision-making of both 
Journal of Coastal Development                                                                                                                                       ISSN : 1410-5217 
Volume 10, Number 2, February 2007  :  73-88                                                                                  Accredited  : 23a / Dikti / Kep / 2004 
 
 
 
How Distributional Conflicts Theory Explain Factors Affecting Institutional Changes in Coral Reef Governance? Lessons learned from 
Gili Indah Village, West Lombok Indonesia 
 
 
 
 
80 
government organizations and 
organizations at the local or donor level, 
so that the decision made is beneficial for 
the rent seekers. If the effort is 
successful, they will expand it so that 
each decision will not be free from their 
influence, which is clearly beneficial to 
them. (3) Corruption can include bribe 
payments and other kinds of illegal 
payment which can change the 
distributional consequences of a 
bargaining outcome.   
This study did not reveal any 
corruption and rent seeking practices among 
Gili Indah fisherman. The interviewed 
fishermen, members of a fisherman 
association, admitted that there was no 
indication of misusing funds of the 
organization by its elites. Although 
corruption and rent seeking are not found 
among Gili Indah fishermen, this does not 
mean that the community is free from 
opportunistic behavior. The fishermen could 
be considered to be practicing free riding 
behavior because of their lack of 
involvement in managing and protecting 
coral reefs while almost all TBOs such as 
hotel owners, restaurants, cafés, diving 
companies, kiosks, Cidomo drivers have 
given their respective contribution. TBOs 
and others whose livelihoods are related to 
the tourism industry on the islands collect 
money for funding coral reef protection. This 
action is beneficial not only for the TBOs but 
for fishermen as well. Meanwhile, fishermen, 
in particular Muroami user, do not give any 
contribution as the others do. Such attitude 
among fisherman could be affected by their 
claim as the “owners” or the true 
beneficiaries of the resources. This could 
also relate to their perceptions on coral reefs 
and fish abundance, as already mentioned 
above. 
 
 
 
   
h. Reciprocity and Trust 
 
Reciprocity is an individual strategy for 
facing social-dilemma situations. It is an 
individual reaction to other individual actions, 
either negative or positive. The most 
commonly found reciprocity is tit-for-tat 
action (Ostrom, 1997). Such reciprocity is a 
common characteristic of the Gili Indah 
community, not only restricted to fishermen 
but also covering other social groups. It exists 
in their daily life. For example, if family A 
invites family B to attend a wedding 
ceremony of family A, family B will feel it 
necessary to invite family A once they have 
similar kind of occasion. Reciprocity is an 
important element for individuals who want 
to have a good reputation as a person 
considered who can work in collective action 
without corruption. Thus, many individuals 
use reciprocity as a short-term investment to 
gain a long-term benefit (Kreps, 1990; Miller, 
1992).  
The Gili Indah community actually 
possesses a good reputation as a cooperative 
and trusted community. It is quite difficult for 
them to violate an agreement made through a 
democratic process, moreover if those 
involved in the making of the agreement feel 
satisfied. The agreement between Ecotrust (a 
diving company association) and Muroami 
users made in May 2003 could be seen as 
evidence of this. The interviews with both 
parties show the existence of trust. They 
believe that each will not cheat the other.  
 
i. Lack of technological skills 
 
Fishermen lack technological skills. The 
fishing technology they apply is classified as 
traditional fishing devices. They usually 
employ outboard-motor boats which only can 
be used to sail within inshore waters. 
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Tourism Business Operators 
 
Gili Indah village offers eco-marine tourism 
services such as clean beaches, coral reefs of 
pristine beauty, ornamental fish, and so on. 
In order to support the tourism activities, 
TBOs develop various support business and 
recreational facilities, such as diving 
companies, hotels, bungalows, restaurants, 
cafés, ticket counters, money changers, 
bicycle rentals, internet cafés, 
telecommunication cafés, and traditional 
handicrafts.  
Each business group has an 
association. However, generally they all take 
shelter under two organizations influential on 
coral reef management practices at the 
village level, i.e., APGA and Ecotrust. 
SATGAS, acting as a marine safeguard, 
actually has a close link to TBOs. In 
comparison to the fishermen, in particular, 
these groups generally are characterized by a 
longer planning horizon, better organization 
experience, higher environmental awareness, 
and have other power resources which are 
important for affecting policies on coral reef 
management (see Table 1). 
a. Long planning horizon  
TBOs have high expectations regarding coral 
reef resources. They consider this ecosystem 
as the only livelihood source that should be 
kept alive and handed on the next generation. 
Accordingly, they seek as much as possible 
to maintain and protect the coral reefs from 
any kinds of activities which potentially 
bring about their destruction. The success of 
reef management is identified by the 
disappearance of destructive fishing, which 
has generated a new feeling of hope for the 
TBOs. Moreover after they have obtained an 
exclusive right to control the resources, they 
then have greater certainty of future 
economic benefits. Therefore, they are 
willing to invest their capital and make 
efforts to materialize the hope and oppose 
each action potentially causing coral reef 
destruction. 
b. Environmental awareness 
The serious efforts and involvement of TBOs 
toward protecting coral reef ecosystems can 
be considered evidence that this group has a 
relatively high environmental awareness 
about the ecosystems’ sustainability. This can 
be empirically recognized from statements of 
the head of Ecotrust and APGA: 
“Coral reefs are our life. We make our life 
from them. We have been able to have a 
better economic situation, such as that of 
recent time, because of their existence. We 
also want our children and grandchildren to 
get the same benefit from them. Therefore, it 
is our moral duty to protect them from any 
kind of destruction” (Hidayat, 2005) 
A deep awareness can also be 
captured from these statements of a cidomo 
driver:   
“Coral reefs? I know them from the tourists 
who often use my Cidomo. They come here to 
enjoy the reefs. I can get much money from 
them. If there is no tourist my income 
decreases. I want them always to come here 
to enjoy our reefs so I will protect them for 
the tourists. I often feel sad when hearing that 
a fisherman destroys them” (Hidayat, 2005).  
c. Organizational experience 
Looking at their involvement in local 
organizations, TBOs may have more 
organization experience. TBO organizations 
have existed longer than fisherman 
associations. Therefore, it is not surprising if 
individuals whose livelihood is related to 
tourism services have a strong desire to join 
relevant organizations. The following 
statements of another Cidomo driver show 
this. 
“Before taking shelter in this association, we 
had difficulties talking to each other, to 
achieve the same perception and to voice our 
aspirations to the village administration. 
However, now it is much simpler. When we 
need to attend a village problem meeting at a 
village office, before joining in it we have a 
pre-meeting among ourselves to unitify our 
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perception, what we need and expect. What 
we agree upon is to be presented in the panel 
meeting…The head of the cidomo driver 
association presents our aspirations to the 
forum. This association is also useful to build 
the environmental of awareness of the 
cidomo driver community”. (Hidayat, 2005).  
A similar opinion is also expressed 
by the representative of a street vendor 
association.  
It is difficult to handle and monitor street 
vendors. They always move from one place 
to another to approach the tourists. We 
initiated the effort to gather them in an 
association to make it easier to build their 
environmental awareness. 
The greater experience in being 
involved in organizations has enabled TBOs 
to have greater organisability. They can 
organize people who have a similar interest 
in coral reef ecosystem and develop a 
collective action program among themselves 
to meet a collective target, i.e.,  to conserve 
coral reef ecosystems in order to generate 
sustainable benefits. This greater ability to 
organize themselves is a source of power by 
which they can affect bargaining outcomes 
and influence policies of coral reef 
management at the local level. Their success 
in driving local governance is grounded, 
among other things, in this power.  
d. Sanction power 
In addition to having relatively good 
organisability and other advantageous 
characteristics as described above, TBOs that 
financially support SATGAS have sanction 
power. That is, a power to impose their 
alternative path of action on other parties or 
to make other parties have commitment to 
their alternative. The source of this power is 
local institutions (awig-awig) that authorize 
them to take any necessary actions against 
coral reef destroyers. Referring to Knight 
(1992), sanctioning can contribute to the 
stability of self-enforcing institutions, 
potentially reducing the expected benefits of 
non-compliance and making compliance a 
more beneficial long-term strategy.  
 
Village Administration  
 
Prior to elaborating the characteristics of 
village administration, it seems necessary to 
highlight its position in the Indonesian 
government hierarchy. Village administration 
in the Orde Baru (New Order) regime was the 
lowest level government organ that had a 
direct command line to the central 
government (see Figure 1). The old Regional 
Government Act No. 5/1979 (UUPD 5/1979) 
clearly defined the village as a certain region 
occupied by a number of individuals unified 
as a legal community, acting as the lowest 
level government organization, and 
possessing the rights to organize their own 
domestic issues under the authority of the 
Republic of Indonesia.  
Although, according to the law, 
village administration has a right to manage 
its own region, at the same time the law also 
states that village administration was the 
lowest level government organization under 
subdistrict. This means that it constituted a 
representative of the central government. 
Consequently, it could only serve as an 
executor of national programs, without the 
ability to refuse or propose any different 
programs. This system had actually 
eliminated the rights of democratization at the 
village level, which generally exhibits 
uniqueness and variety from one village to 
another. During the period, the government 
attempted to homogenize the villages and 
eliminated the variety.  The villages had 
nearly no rights at all to create their own 
rules, including rules for conducting the 
management of natural resources (Suhartono 
et al.,  2001
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Fig. 1: Hierarchy of Governmental Structure in Indonesia 
Source: Hidayat (2005 ) 
 
Suhartono et al (2001) proposed that what 
the New Order regime did was not only to 
position village administration as the lowest 
organ of the government hierarchy, but also 
tried to homogenize them to fit into the same 
scheme and model (Figure 2). Even though 
there was a statement that government 
should retain the heterogeneity of culture 
existing within the villages, that was only a 
rhetoric. In the structure there existed two 
important government elements, that is, the 
Head of Village Administration and Village 
Convention Board (LMD). Suhartono et al 
(2001) criticized the structure as a 
centralized scheme contending that even 
though there is a LMD which should actually 
be a channel for grass root aspiration, in fact 
it is infertile. The infertility is caused by the 
fact that a head and secretary of village 
administration, according to UUPD 5/1979, at 
the same time also hold a position as a head 
and secretary of LMD. In other words, they 
become a head and secretary of LMD due to 
their position as a head and secretary of 
village administration.  It can be assumed that 
this was only an attempt by the central 
government to easily control local 
community, by which it could implement the 
central government’s program and interests 
without any obstacles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Former Village Administration Structure 
Source: Hidayat (2005) 
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Since 1999 Indonesia has a new 
Regional Government Act (22/1999), which 
substitutes for the old one. According to this 
Act, local governments (district and city) are 
autonomous, with their relationship to the 
provincial government being not a command 
relation but rather a coordinative one. The 
governor has no right to give orders to 
Bupati or other local government heads. The 
same status is also held by the village 
administration. The new Act considers 
villages to be autonomous administration 
units at the lowest level. In spite of being 
structurally directly under the subdistrict 
level, village administration is not directly 
controlled by the former, but merely 
coordinated through it. In other words, the 
former only coordinates development 
activities of villages where KADES/Lurah 
(head of village administration) must not be 
responsible to Camat (head of subdistrict), 
but directly to Bupati. 
The arrival of autonomous village 
administration was signaled by the 
emergence of Village Parliaments (BPD), 
substituting for the LMD and serving as a 
legislative body. The head of this body 
occupies a position of the same high level as 
the head of village administration (KADES). 
One important point to notice is  
that there is a separation of legislative and 
executive functions, which during the period 
of the New Order regime was impossible 
(Figure 3). In short, following the new Act, 
village administration consists of a village 
secretary (SEKDES, or other name according 
to region) and its staff serving as an executive 
body and BPD a legislative one.  
Suhartono et al (2001) identified five 
types relationship between the village 
administration and the BPD: (1) a 
responsibility relationship which necessitates 
KADES to give a responsibility report to the 
BPD when he or she terminates his or her 
duty; (2) a consultation and cooperation 
relationship, where in executing 
governmental duties the KADES must consult 
and cooperate with the BPD; (3) a working 
relationship, where both can cooperate in 
making up working programs and village 
regulations; (4) a control relationship, where 
the BPD can control the work performance of 
the KADES. In addition, the BPD may have a 
right to channel the grass root aspirations and 
suggestions to the KADES. Following the 
new regional government law, since 2000 Gili 
Indah village has changed its administration 
structure. Beside the KADES and his staff, 
this village also has a BPD acting as the 
KADES’ partner in making village policies.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           Fig. 3:   Scheme of Links between Village Administration and Village Parliament 
Source: Suhartono et al (2001) 
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As shown in Table 1 (see page 2), 
Gili Indah village administration officers 
have relatively better organization capacity 
and stronger bargaining power, but also are 
seen as untrustworthy and have bad 
reputation. These characteristics affect its 
role in institutional change and local 
governance. Good organization skills are 
indicated by their relatively higher level of 
education. From the eight staff members, two 
graduated from lower high school, five 
completed upper high school, and one holds 
a bachelor’s degree. In addition, they often 
deal with a variety of activities. This village 
administration also has a relatively stronger 
bargaining position compared to other local 
organizations. This is caused by its position 
as a formal governmental organization, 
whose head is elected by residents, 
acknowledged and established formally by 
the head of the district government. Due to 
this position, it also has direct access to the 
higher (district) level of policy maker5. 
Nonetheless, Gili Indah village 
officials have a bad reputation. Most 
informants consider the village 
administration staff to be corrupt. This is 
mainly caused by their unaccountability in 
                                                
5   Although the village administration has 
direct access to the district government, it is 
still unable to influence the policies made by 
the district. This could be mainly caused by an 
embedded self-conception among village 
officers that they occupy the lowest level 
organ of Indonesia government. During the 
New Order regime, village administrations 
were positioned as the executors of the 
policies coming from the higher level 
government, which they considered to be the 
boss. They were also indoctrinated with 
principles such as “the boss never fails; this is 
the instruction of the boss; the boss knows 
better,” and so on which derive from 
feudalistic government systems (Suhartono et 
al., 2001). This mindset has made village 
officers unconfident when facing with the 
“bosses” of subdistrict, district, moreover 
from provincial and national levels. This also 
applies to Gili Indah village administration 
officers 
managing public funds.6 The interviewed 
villagers considered that the allocations of the 
budget to be unclear; there is even a strong 
indication of misuse of the budget that should 
be used for environmental interests, including 
coral reef patrol and monitoring. This 
situation prompted the emergence of APGA 
and Ecotrust, which have initiated the raising 
of funds and have conducted self-
management. The following statements reveal 
a attitude of distrust that undermine the 
reputation of the village administration 
officers: 
“We know exactly that each month the village 
administration receives money from TBOs. 
As TBOs, we agree to do it and always meet 
our obligations. However, how do they 
allocate the money? We never know, or get 
reports, how they allocate the money. If they 
claim that the money is spent to construct 
public facilities, which public facilities? 
Nothing new is built in this village. We are 
quite sure that they misuse it for personal 
interests”.  
 
Yayasan Front Pemuda SATGAS 
 
Yayasan Front Pemuda SATGAS (SATGAS 
Youth Front Foundation), well-known as 
SATGAS, has organized the coral reef and 
marine resource security activities in the area 
since 2000. The villagers identified as 
members of this organization generally have a 
relatively better educational background, 
organizational skills, sufficient knowledge on 
the resources in question, and better 
                                                
6
   The village administration of Gili Indah 
has two budget sources: the district 
government and TBOs. The first is a yearly 
budget to be used for financing development 
activities; the second is initially collected from 
TBOs for funding management of coral reefs, 
coastal environment and other tourism 
purposes. second is initially collected from 
TBOs for funding management of coral reefs, 
coastal environment and other tourism 
purposes. 
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environmental awareness. They have made 
much contact with environmentally aware 
international tourists, who usually have great 
concern for the resources. Prior to involving 
themselves in the SATGAS, they were also 
youth organization activists who successfully 
organized different activities at the village.7  
The organization holds a strategic 
role. It gets trust from the community to 
guard marine resources and is responsible for 
the monitoring and patrol of the waters 
around the islands. Since its emergence, it 
has executed the tasks well. Therefore, it has 
built a good reputation, sufficient trust and 
strong bargaining power. Due to the good 
reputation, it often receives mandates from 
the local community to handle other social 
problems, such as cases of looting, fighting, 
threatening, and other social disorders. Their 
reputation in dealing with coral reef 
problems has reached the national level, 
where SATGAS officers are often asked to 
present papers concerning their success 
story.   
Strong financial support, good 
reputation, credibility and trust have made 
SATGAS very influential on local coral reef 
management strategy. It plays a main role in 
local governance structure. Local level 
policy on coral reef management can hardly 
be free from its influence. A policy made 
without its involvement would barely be 
                                                
7
   The head, secretary and staff of 
SATGAS are commonly upper secondary 
school graduates. Prior to forming this 
organization they were involved in Karang 
Taruna (village youth organization). They 
have better awareness on coral reef 
ecosystems because of more contact with 
tourists, other organizations and other sources 
of information concerning these resources. 
They become convinced of the need to save 
coral reefs after they realized that the 
ecosystems, which can attract tourists, could 
improve their economic status. Their 
statements illustrate this attitude: “If there are 
no coral reefs, there would be no tourism 
here. We might have been fishermen as 
others”…. (Hidayat, 2005). 
implemented.  In spite of being powerful at 
the village level, however, SATGAS is still 
not powerful enough to influence policies 
made at the district level. This could be 
caused by their distant relationship with the 
district government. They also have no 
contact with or representatives to it.  
 
Natural Resource Conservation Agency 
 
The Natural Resource Conservation Agency 
(BKSDA) is the only government agency 
authorized to manage conservation areas. It is 
the only property right holder over all 
conservation areas in Indonesia, and is 
responsible to carry out management tasks, 
ranging from planning and implementation to 
law enforcement and monitoring. Due to the 
status of its coral reefs as a conservation area, 
BKSDA also operates in Gili Indah. Our 
investigation shows that this stakeholder has 
good organization capacity and strong 
bargaining power, but lacks trust and has bad 
reputation (Table 1, page 2).   
BKSDA has organized the 
management of coral reef conservation for 
many years. The officers working at this 
agency have been accustomed to organizing 
different conservation activities and have 
special training on how to undertake 
conservation tasks, such as patrolling, 
monitoring, investigating and so on. 
Therefore, they have good organizational 
skills and good knowledge of the resources in 
question. In addition, as the sole property 
right holder, the agency holds all rights to 
control access over the resources. Individuals 
or companies that want to invest in these 
resources, so as to benefit economically from 
them, must get permission from this agency. 
Due to such privilege, it holds strong 
bargaining power with both the local 
community (resource users) and other 
agencies that have similar interests. It can 
affect policies concerning the conserved coral 
reef ecosystems. The local marine and 
fisheries agency and other agencies in West 
Lombok admit the authority of BKSDA.  
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As an agency responsible to protect 
the resources, the officers always think of 
fishermen as potential violators. They even 
categorize fishermen as a user group to be 
monitored or considered as a dangerous 
threat. They only think about how to 
conserve and protect the resources, 
regardless of user groups’ dependence on 
them. As a result, the agency faces a strong 
resistance from local fishermen and has a bad 
reputation among them. Fishermen consider 
the agency to have robbed them of their 
inherited rights. Consequently, the agency 
often has trouble implementing policies 
related to coral reef conservation.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
I have discussed actor characteristics that 
influence the institutional change in coral 
reef management. Almost all frameworks for 
institutional analysis of CPRs—from 
Oakerson (1992) and Hagedorn et al. (2002) 
to Dolsak and Ostrom (2003)—said that 
resource user characteristics are viewed by 
scholars of institutional economics as 
important factors of institutional innovation 
and collective action at every level. 
Therefore, study of the institutions of CPRs 
involves the determinants almost throughout.  
As described in this paper, self-
governance of coral reef management in the 
study location involves six different actors, 
five of which are considered as internal 
actors: fishermen, Ecotrust and APGA (TBO 
representatives), SATGAS, village 
administration, and BKSDA. One other, 
LMNLU, is classified as an external actor, 
which only plays a role at the collective-
choice level.  
TBO, SATGAS, BKSDA and the 
village administration (see Table 1) have 
similar characteristics: a relatively better 
organizational experience, higher 
environmental awareness, long planning 
horizons and high bargaining power. These 
characteristics are basic capital, driving them 
to get involved in institutional change 
processes and self-governance. Unfortunately, 
BKSDA as de jure property right holder, 
responsible for dealing with daily 
management activities, has a bad reputation 
with the fishermen community. Such 
impression has emerged due to its authority, 
which has excluded fishermen from 
benefiting from coral reef ecosystems. 
Fishermen consider the agency to be a thief of 
resources they inherited from their ancestors. 
Similar to BKSDA, the village 
administration also has a bad reputation. This 
is so due to its non-transparency and 
unaccountability in managing and allocating 
public funds. As already mentioned, the 
village administration receives both a subsidy 
from the district government and monthly 
contributions from TBOs. The accusation of 
misusing the budgets addressed to the village 
administration officials has decreased the 
community’s trust, materialized in the 
reduction of their spirit or motivation to act 
collectively as well as in their rejection of any 
programs that come from the village.  
The subsequent actor influential in 
institutional change and self-governance of 
coral reef management is fishermen. 
Fishermen are identified as actors who have 
lower organizational capacity, higher 
opportunistic behavior, lack of environmental 
awareness or have misperceptions about coral 
reef resources, short planning horizon, low 
bargaining power, low technological skills, 
and uncertainty. These characteristics are 
disadvantageous for building self-governance. 
Low environmental awareness, misperception 
about resources, opportunistic behavior, and 
short planning horizon, for instance, act as a 
strong disincentive for the actors to invest in 
coral reef protection. Meanwhile, low 
organizational capacity and bargaining power 
could marginalize the actors from an action 
arena, degrade their roles and decrease the 
trust of other actors.  
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